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Introduction
Employment discrimination actions against religious organiza-
tions have been plentiful for decades.1 No judicial consensus has
emerged, however, to identify the point at which an employer's claim
of religious autonomy must yield to the public interest in eradicating
invidious discrimination. Because the only Supreme Court decision in
this area2 turned on the constitutionality of a limited statutory exemp-
tion from Title VII,3 there is no authoritative guidance on the most
problematic issue of all: whether the First Amendment exempts reli-
gious institutions from the application of employment discrimination
laws.
A trilogy of significant law review articles published during the
last fifteen years offered various solutions to the controversy.4 These
articles have been widely cited by the lower courts.5 The Supreme
Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,6 however, ne-
gates many assumptions upon which the academic commentaries were
constructed and undercuts the few points of agreement in the case
law.
1. See generally ROBERT T. SANDIN, AUTONOMY AND FAITH: RELIGIOUS PREFER-
ENCE IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS IN RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED HIGHER EDUCATION
(1990) (collecting cases involving institutions of higher education).
2. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding stat-
utory exemption from Title VII over Establishment Clause challenge).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The application of Title
VII to religious institutions is discussed infra notes 34-75 and accompanying text.
4. Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514 (1979); Douglas Lay-
cock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Rela-
tions and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); Ira C. Lupu,
Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987).
5. At least 35 state and federal courts have cited to Bagni, Laycock or Lupu. If one
agrees with Judge Posner that citations by other academics are the true measure of influ-
ence, these articles measure up.
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that state criminal law on controlled substances may
be applied to sacramental use of peyote in Native American Church, and state may deny
unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use).
Prior to 1990, the lower courts had routinely granted religious
employers free exercise exemptions from laws governing employment
discrimination.7 This approach may no longer be viable. The lower
federal courts are reading the Smith decision to prohibit free exercise
exemptions from laws that are not directed at religious organizations.
Since the employment discrimination laws are not directed at religious
institutions, Smith requires a reconsideration of the continuing validity
of those early decisions. This Article will examine the current consti-
tutional status of exemptions from anti-discrimination laws based on
the free exercise rights of religious employers.
The convictions held by both sides of this debate-those who
favor constitutional exemptions and those who oppose them-are
powerful and deeply felt. Employment discrimination laws reflect so-
ciety's understanding of legitimate and illegitimate bases of power and
status in the workplace. When a religious institution claims a constitu-
tional right to pay women lower wages for performing the same work
as men, that institution is not only communicating its religious beliefs;
it also is sending a powerful social message about the value of wo-
men's labor. Because churches have long enjoyed a role of moral and
ethical leadership, the resistance of religious organizations to equal
employment laws can undermine the effectiveness of those laws in the
public sphere.
As churches continue to involve themselves in business and com-
mercial ventures, the stakes increase on both sides of the equation.
The financial growth and commercial expansion of churches not only
increase the number of jobs affected by church policies; they also raise
issues of competitive disadvantage. Constitutionally-based exemp-
tions from labor and employment laws provide religious organizations
with significantly more latitude and bargaining power than their secu-
lar competitors. This differential enables churches to acquire even
more power and influence in worldly affairs.'
On the other side of the equation, enforcing anti-discrimination
laws against religious employers threatens religious pluralism by man-
7. See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference, 818 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
8. See Ira C. Lupu, Risky Business, 101 HARV. L. Rnv. 1303, 1318 (1988) (arguing
that religious institutions obtain more leverage over their community from a right to dis-
criminate than from the power to block liquor license applications).
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dating conformity to majoritarian values and practices.' Religious or-
ganizations that oppose federal regulation invariably contend that
their employment decisions are linked to their religious convictions.
This claim is powerful because it offends both religious and nonreli-
gious Americans by having the courts pressed into judgment on what
are essentially matters of faith.10 These concerns are especially strong
when the opposing parties consist of churches and members of the
clergy. Courts presented with these claims have frankly expressed
their unwillingness to arbitrate disputes involving church policies and
the internal discipline of clerics."
Ironically, while church-clergy disputes are a paradigm of an em-
ployment relationship deserving constitutional protection, these cases
send a forceful message. For example, the exclusion of women from
positions of power and influence in the Catholic Church forcefully
communicates the inferior status of women within the hierarchy of
that church. 12 So long as society professes a commitment to anti-dis-
crimination norms, it cannot turn a blind eye to the role of religion in
fostering and reinforcing cultural roles. At a minimum, the dividing
lines between spheres of religious autonomy and secular authority
should be clearly drawn to allow religion its proper sphere of influ-
ence. The current tensions in the Supreme Court's free exercise opin-
ions are painful precisely because the opinions blur existing lines of
demarcation.3
Prior to Smith, the majority of employment discrimination claims
against religious employers progressed along predictable analytic
lines.' 4 First, a court would examine the anti-discrimination law(s) re-
lied on by the plaintiff to determine whether the religious employer
was exempted in whole or in part. If no exemptions were available,
the court would then consider whether the Free Exercise Clause pro-
9. Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group
Rights, 1989 Wis. L. Rnv. 99, 102 (1989).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,86 (1944) ("Heresy trials are foreign
to our Constitution. Men may believe whatthey cannot prove. They may not be put to the
proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.").
11. See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363
(8th Cir. 1991) (citing Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 894 F.2d 1354,1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) ("'We cannot imagine an area of inquiry less
suited to a temporal court."').
12. Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 743,751
(1992).
13. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2250
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
14. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
896 (1972).
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hibited the law's application. Resolving the free exercise issue re-
quired the court to engage in compelling interest analysis. Under that
test, as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,15 government action that sub-
stantially burdens religious practices must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be pursued by narrowly tailored
means.16 The court would explicitly balance the government's interest
in enforcing the challenged law against the interest of the employer in
the unburdened exercise of religious liberty. If the interests of the
employer outweighed the government's interest, the court would
either go on to consider whether granting the exemption presented a
problem under the Establishment Clause, or would simply conclude
that the law was unconstitutional as applied and dismiss the action. If,
on the other hand, the balance of interests favored the government,
the court would move on to determine the merits of the employment
discrimination claim.' 7
While this analytical framework never achieved the virtue of pre-
dictability, it was relatively straightforward for the courts to apply.
The lower federal courts built up a body of case law that exempted the
relationship between churches and their ministers from the anti-dis-
crimination laws, based on the understanding that failure to do so
would abridge the free exercise rights of religious institutions. 18 The
main challenges for courts became determining whether or not a par-
ticular employment relationship should be characterized as "ministe-
rial,"'19 and whether any independent procedural immunities existed
that might protect a religious employer from the investigatory and re-
15. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. Id. at 402-03; see also Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2226; Hernandez v. Comm'r,
490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
17. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982);
Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 495 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 738 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1984); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Advent-
ists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
18. See McClure 460 F.2d at 560 (refusing to apply Title VII to relationship between
church and minister to avoid First Amendment issues); see also EEOC v. Southwestern
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905
(1982) (applying McClure to exempt all academic employees of theological seminary from
Title VII); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
912 (1981) (refusing to extend McClure to entire faculty of religiously affiliated college).
19. See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (editorial secretary at
religious publishing house not a minister); Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp. 667
(M.D. Tenn. 1982) (same); Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980)
(teacher of secular subjects at religious school not a minister).
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porting processes of state agencies seeking to enforce anti-discrimina-
tion laws.20
Employment Division v. Smith21 undermined the most critical
part of this analytical framework. In Smith, a five-member majority
refused to apply the compelling interest test to determine whether the
Constitution required an exemption from a neutral criminal law of
general application.22 Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
indicated that the compelling interest test should be applied only in
"hybrid" cases, where the claimant demonstrated that the law bur-
dened both the free exercise right and another fundamental constitu-
tional right (such as freedom of speech),23 In hybrid cases, the
traditional balancing test would still apply, and exemptions would be
available when the individual's interest in the exemption outweighed
the government's interest in enforcing the regulation. But in non-hy-
brid cases like Smith, the majority determined that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require the balancing of individual and governmental
interests, and that requests for religious exemptions should be
denied.24
The scope of the Court's analysis in Smith implicitly extended be-
yond criminal laws to include civil regulations and most lower courts
have not hesitated to apply the decision in that context.' Accord-
20. See Dayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th
Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (Sixth Circuit immunized perva-
sively religious school from state investigatory process; Supreme Court reversed, finding
abstention was necessary to permit exhaustion of state administrative proceedings).
21. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
22. Id. at 884.
23. Id. at 881-85.
24. Id. at 890.
25. See, e.g., Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927,932 (6th Cir. 1991)
(applying Smith to school district's policy requiring equivalency testing as precondition of
credit for religious home schooling); Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs,
919 F.2d 183, 194-96 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that Smith applies to civil as well as criminal
statutes); Rector, Wardens and Members v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir.
1990) (applying Smith rule to New York's Landmarks Law); Intercommunity Ctr. for Jus-
tice and Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42,44 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying Smith to compel compliance
with reporting provisions of Immigration Reform and Control Act); Prince v. Firman, 584
A.2d 8 (D.C. App. 1990) (applying Smith to uphold application of state statute governing
reversion of property rights over free exercise challenge); Health Services v. Temple Bap-
tist Church, 814 P.2d 130 (N.M. App. 1991) (applying Smith to uphold licensing ordinance
for child care centers). The Ninth Circuit has, however, limited the application of Smith to
laws that punish criminal conduct. See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thorn-
burgh, 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991); NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965 (1992). A limited number of district courts have also
taken this position. See, e.g., United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991);
Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 756 F. Supp. 1498, 1514 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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ingly, a court presented with an employment discrimination claim
against a religious employer must resolve the two questions Smith
makes critical: First, are anti-discrimination laws "neutral laws of gen-
eral application" within the meaning of Smith? Second, does the ap-
plication of such laws to religious institutions present a hybrid
constitutional claim?
Part I discusses and summarizes the case law in this area, both
prior to and following the Smith decision. Part II addresses the first
question, arguing that anti-discrimination laws are neutral and gener-
ally applicable laws within the meaning of Smith. Part II also consid-
ers the alternative position, namely that anti-discrimination laws are
neither neutral nor generally applicable. While this position lacks in-
tuitive appeal, it may be pursued by religious employers uncertain of
their capacity to mount a successful hybrid claim. Part II concludes
that even if anti-discrimination laws fail the neutrality inquiry, reli-
gious employers will still be unable to secure constitutional exemp-
tions that go beyond the scope of the legislative exemptions presently
available.
Part III considers the second question. This Part discusses vari-
ous possible hybrid claims, but concludes that courts are unlikely to
recognize hybrid claims for exemption. As a result, religious employ-
ers are in danger of losing the exempt status courts tended to award
them prior to Smith.
This Article concludes that Smith is fundamentally inconsistent
with the existing body of case law exempting religious employers from
state and federal anti-discrimination laws on free exercise grounds. If
Smith continues to command the support of a Supreme Court major-
ity,26 which is itself an open question, 7 religious employers are likely
26. Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Smith was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist,
Stevens and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, based on her applica-
tion of the compelling interest test, but did not agree that the compelling interest test
should be confined to cases involving hybrid rights. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Last term, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113
S. Ct. 2217 (1993), Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens, Scalia and Thomas joined Justice
Kennedy in an opinion that reiterated the Smith rule.
27. See, e.g., Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that
Smith creates substantial tension with prior case law and should be reexamined). Justice
O'Connor expressed strong disagreement with the Smith rule in that decision, id. at 891
(O'Connor, J., concurring), and Justice Blackmun filed a sharp dissent. Id. at 907 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined the majority in both Smith and Lukumi Babalu,
but has not written separately to make the basis for his opinion clear. Justice Thomas
joined the majority in Lukumi Babalu without a separate opinion and has written no opin-
ions on religion clause issues. Justice Ginsburg has yet to articulate her position while on
the Court.
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to find themselves limited to the narrow statutory exemptions that the
anti-discrimination laws currently provide.'
This Article also contends that the hybrid-rights approach to free
exercise exemptions is not only jurisprudentially unsound, as others
have concluded,29 but unworkable in practical application. Analyzing
the hybrid-rights claim that a typical religious employer might present
clearly demonstrates that the walls of this defense will not stand. A
successful hybrid-rights claim has the potential to eradicate Smith as a
precedent;30 an unsuccessful claim is likely to force a reappraisal of
the right of individuals to join together for the purpose of engaging in
free speech, free exercise and other constitutional liberties.3 1 The for-
mer possibility stands as an interesting alternative to the legislative
response to Smith-the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 32-- a law
whose constitutional status remains uncertain.3 3 Religious exemp-
28. This situation would have a dramatic impact on religious employers. For instance,
the legislative exemptions do not protect religious employers from liability for common
employment practices, such as the exclusion of women from ministerial positions.
29. See, e.g., James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv.
91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 1; Michael
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109
(1990); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Dis-
course, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149 (1991); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in
the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (1991).
30. Justice Souter made this point in Lukumi Babalu. Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at
2240 (Souter, J., concurring); see infra text accompanying notes 190-233.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 190-233.
32. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (1993), incorporates the compelling interest test as a limit on governmental action. A
fair assessment of the impact of the Act on this issue is generally beyond the scope of this
Article, however, a few comments are warranted. The Act will clearly protect free exercise
rights against infringement by any state, since acts of Congress take precedence over con-
flicting provisions in state statutes. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Thus, religious employers would be able to obtain exemptions under the Act from any
state law prohibiting employment discrimination.
Title VII, however, is a federal statute, entitled to equal deference from the courts.
Since the Religious Freedom Restoration Act protects free exercise rights against interfer-
ence from any "government," defined to include "a branch, department, agency, instru-
mentality, and official ... of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State," the law
has the potential to be a loose cannon in the courts. Courts faced with claimants seeking to
enforce a federal statutory right of free exercise, opposed by those seeking to enforce fed-
eral laws prohibiting discrimination, will have an unenviable task of statutory construction.
33. Since the Act essentially recasts a judicial interpretation of the First Amendment
as a statutory right, it is likely to face constitutional challenge. Opponents of the bill may
argue that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers (in effect, the act directs courts
to apply the Free Exercise Clause without regard to Smith) and is ultra vires (because it
may not be supportable as an exercise of Congressional power under either the Commerce
Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment). It may also be challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds. Possible opponents of the bill include right-to-life groups, who are con-
tions from employment discrimination statutes thus illustrate the prac-
tical weaknesses and structural defects of Smith, as well as raise very
real concerns for religious employers.
I. Religious Institutions and Title VI
Do federal anti-discrimination laws apply to religious institu-
tions? The question has both statutory and constitutional compo-
nents. This Part will begin by considering the extent to which
Congress intended anti-discrimination laws to apply to religious insti-
tutions by examining the scope of the statutory exemptions provided
to religious employers. Since the statutory exemptions do not protect
religious employers from liability for common employment practices,
the question of constitutional exemptions will then be considered.3"
This Part also surveys lower court decisions that have applied the
Smith rule to deny free exercise exemptions from neutral civil laws.
The recent body of precedent indicates that the lower courts are uni-
formly applying the Smith rule in civil contexts and, as a result, are
denying most applications for constitutional exemptions.
A. A Brief Overview of Title VII
As the centerpiece of federal anti-discrimination efforts, Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act3 5 is a natural starting point for an exami-
nation of the anti-discrimination laws most often invoked against reli-
gious employers. Title VII claims may be brought in either state or
federal courts,3 6 and most state laws prohibiting employment discrimi-
nation are patterned after Title VII.37 Accordingly, state courts
presented with discrimination claims that arise under state law often
look to the federal case law interpreting Title VII for guidance. This
Part examines the statutory exemptions Title VII gives religious em-
cerned that the bill may provide a legal basis for abortion. See generally James E. Wood,
Jr., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 33 J. OF CHURCH & ST. 673, 678-79 (1991)
(arguing that the bill is abortion neutral); see also, Ira C. Lupu Statutes Revolving in Consti-
tutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REv. 1, 52-66 (1993) (discussing problems raised by statutes
that incorporate constitutional standards, including the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act).
34. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
36. See generally id, § 2000e-5(f)(3) (granting federal courts jurisdiction to hear Title
VII cases); Yellow Freight Sys. Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims).
37. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Anderson 1991); see generally 1 AR-
THUR LARsON & LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, §§ 9.10-9.30 (1993)
(collecting and summarizing state statutes).
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ployers and briefly summarizes the extent of an employer's obliga-
tions under the statute when no exemptions are available.
In general terms, Title VII prohibits any "employer"38 from dis-
criminating against employees or job applicants with respect to their
compensation, or the terms, conditions and privileges of their employ-
ment, where the discrimination is based upon the employee/appli-
cant's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 9 The statute
provides three exemptions applicable to religious employers: the reli-
gious corporation exemption,40 the religious schools exemption,41 and
the "bona fide occupational qualification" provision.42 These provi-
sions overlap to some extent and are used by employers as alternative
defenses.
The religious corporation exemption is found in section 702. This
provision exempts religious corporations, associations, educational in-
stitutions or societies "with respect to the employment of individuals
of a particular religion to perform work connected with" the organiza-
tion's activities.43 As enacted, this provision only included employees
whose duties were connected with the employer's "religious activi-
ties." In 1972, however, Congress deleted the term "religious" and
thus broadened the scope of the exemption to include employees
whose duties were secular as well as those whose duties were con-
nected to the religious mission of the corporation."
The scope of section 702 is often misunderstood. The exemption
only extends to discrimination based on an employee's religion and
does not authorize discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, or
national origin. The legislative history is clear on this point, since
Congress considered and rejected a blanket exemption that would
have placed religious employers outside the scope of covered "em-
ployers. 4a Instead, Congress chose to tailor the exemption narrowly,
38. An "employer" is defined as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has 15 or more employees for each working day of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
year of or the year preceding the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
39. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
40. Id. § 2000e-1.
41. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
42. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
43. Id. § 2000e-1 (section 702(a)).
44. For a discussion of the various proposals and amendments that Congress consid-
ered in enacting and amending § 702, see William P. Marshall & Joanne C. Brant, Employ-
ment Discrimination In Religious Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, in PUBLIC VALUES,
PRIVATE ScHoors 91, 93-94 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989).
45. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896
(1972) (discussing legislative history of § 702).
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exempting religious institutions only from the law's prohibition of reli-
gious discrimination.46
The second exemption is specifically directed at religious schools.
Section 703(e)(2) permits schools, colleges, universities and other edu-
cational institutions that are substantially owned, supported, or con-
trolled by religious organizations to "hire and employ" persons of a
particular religion.47 Once again, this exemption does not authorize
discrimination on any basis other than religion. Moreover, because of
the "hire and employ" language, courts have limited the scope of this
exemption to initial hiring decisions. 48 Because of the overlap be-
tween sections 702(a) and 703(e)(2), religious schools typically invoke
both provisions to defend against charges of religious discrimination.49
These limited exemptions, which authorize discrimination solely
on the basis of an employee's religion, are the only statutory relief
that Congress specifically provided to religious employers. A third
provision, which functions as an affirmative defense,50 is found in sec-
tion 703(e)(1) of Title VII.5' This section permits any employer, reli-
gious or secular, to "hire and employ" persons based on their sex,
religion, or national origin so long as the employer can prove that
characteristic is essential to the performance of the employee's duties.
In the statutory parlance, the employer must show that sex, religion,
or national origin is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.""2
46. In fact, section 702 may not exempt religious employers from all liability for reli-
gious discrimination. The terms of the exemption speak only of the "employment of" indi-
viduals, while Title VII's substantive prohibitions extend further, covering the
"compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employment." Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (section 702(a)) with iL § 2000e-2(a) (section 703(a)). Arguably, the restrictive
language of the exemption reflects Congressional intent to permit religious corporations to
use religion as the basis for an initial hiring decision, but not to discriminate against em-
ployees thereafter with respect to their compensation or other aspects of their
employment.
47. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (section 703(e)(2)). This provision also applies to schools
whose curriculum is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
48. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that § 702 does not authorize religious discrimination after employment relationship has
attached or in the provision of benefits).
49. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding Catholic school's
discharge of Protestant teacher because of remarriage protected by both statutory
exemptions).
50. BARBARA ScHLEI & PAUL GROSsMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 341
(1983).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (section 703(e)(1)).
52. aId
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While the bona fide occupation qualification ("BFOQ") defense
is popular in employment discrimination cases, the courts have con-
strued it narrowly.53 Employers may never use race or color as a
BFOQ, and customer preference will not suffice to demonstrate that
sex, religion, or national origin amounts to a BFOQ.54 Generally
speaking, an employer seeking to hire only men for a particular job
must prove that all or substantially all women would be unable to per-
form the duties of that job in order to make out a BFOQ defense
based on sex. 55
Religious schools have attempted to prove that religion is a
BFOQ for certain teaching positions. These efforts have produced
mixed results. In Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago,5 6 the court
permitted a Jesuit university to set aside three tenure-track positions
under the BFOQ provision in order to maintain a "Jesuit presence" in
the philosophy department. However, in EEOC v. Kamehameha
Schools/Bishop Estate,57 a school whose founder's will directed that
"the teachers of said schools shall forever be persons of the Protestant
religion"5" was not permitted to limit all teaching jobs to Protestants
under the BFOQ provision. The Ninth Circuit found that the testa-
mentary language merely expressed a "personal preference" which
was insufficient to create a BFOQ.5 9
An interesting issue arising under both the BFOQ defense and
the religious employer exemptions is whether discrimination based on
53. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)
(holding that employer cannot defend single-sex fetal protection policy as BFOQ); Trans
World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122-25 (1985) (construing BFOQ defense nar-
rowly in age discrimination suit); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977) (hold-
ing sex is BFOQ for prison guards in "contact positions" within all-male penitentiary).
54. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency responsible for in-
terpreting and implementing Title VII, has issued regulations stating that the preferences
of customers, clients and co-workers should not be considered in determining whether a
BFOQ has been established by the employer. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(iii) (1993); see also
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)
(holding that airline cannot use sex as BFOQ for flight attendants based on customer
preference).
55. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (rejecting BFOQ defense
where employer refused to hire women with preschool age children).
56. 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986)
57. 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).
58. Id. at 459 n.1.
59. The school was unable to qualify for either the religious corporation exemption
(the school's purpose and character were primarily secular and no religious denomination
owned, controlled, or managed the school) or the religious schools exemption (school
lacked religious control and the curriculum was not directed toward the propagation of the
Protestant faith). Id. at 461.
an unmarried employee's pregnancy can be defended as discrimina-
tion based on religion. There is little consensus on the issue. In
Dolter v. Wahlert High School,6" a Catholic school discharged a preg-
nant, unmarried English teacher. The court found that the employer
had failed to prove that adherence to Catholic precepts was a BFOQ
for her position. 6' Where counseling teenage girls on birth control
was central to the pregnant employee's duties, however, the court ac-
cepted the BFOQ defense.62
Another employer who offered "head of household" salary sup-
plements to male employees with homemaker spouses, but did not for
female employees similarly situated, was unable to prove a BFOQ de-
fense based on the employer's religious beliefs about the differenti-
ated roles of the sexes.63 The court noted that the BFOQ provision,
like the religious schools exemption in section 703(e)(2), referred to
"hiring and employment" and reasoned that this language did not au-
thorize religious discrimination in compensation or other employment
benefits.64
The ability of employees to safely perform their job duties can
also be considered as part of the BFOQ inquiry. In Dothard v. Rawl-
inson,65 safety considerations played a substantial role in the Court's
decision to recognize sex as a BFOQ for prison guards in positions
requiring close contact with violent male inmates.66 Another em-
ployer was able to establish that adherence to the Moslem faith was a
BFOQ for a job as a helicopter pilot ferrying pilgrims to Mecca.67 In
each of these decisions, the safety concerns of the employers were
closely connected to the ability of the employees to perform the duties
of their position.68
60. 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
61. Id. at 271-72; see also Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (finding that acting as a "role model" was not central to plaintiff's job duties as a
librarian where she was discharged for out-of-wedlock pregnancy).
62. See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (up-
holding non-religious employer's dismissal of an unwed, pregnant employee). The em-
ployer in Chambers did not attempt to argue that the discrimination was based on religion.
63. EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 1366-67.
65. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
66. Id. at 336.
67. Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1984) (noting that Muslim law prohibits non-Muslims from flying to Mecca on
punishment of death).
68. See, e.g., Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986) (re-
jecting BFOQ defense where employer refused to grant Jewish physicians rotations in
Saudi Arabia based on employer's concern for their safety).
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If an employer does not fall within any of these three statutory
exemptions, then the employer is required to comply with the duel
obligations imposed by Title VII. First, an employer must "reasonably
accommodate" its employees' religious observances and practices un-
less the employer can demonstrate that accommodation would entail
"undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. ' 69 In ad-
dition, an employer must comply with the general statutory prohibi-
tion on religious discrimination against employees and job applicants,
with respect to both their compensation and the terms, conditions,
and privileges of their employment.7 °
The potential force of the reasonable accommodation require-
ment has been largely diluted by a series of Supreme Court opin-
ions.71 Generally, employers have little difficulty winning religious
discrimination cases that turn on the question of accommodation. 72
Plaintiffs tend to prevail in these actions only where the employer of-
fers neither accommodation nor proof of undue hardship.73 Because
the religious accommodation cases rarely involve constitutional is-
sues,74 this Article will not review those cases in greater detail.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
70. Id. § 2000e-2(a); see EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch. 781 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (4th.
Cir. 1986).
71. The Supreme Court has interpreted "undue hardship" to mean any accommoda-
tion that results in more than a de minimis cost to the employer. Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (employer meets duty of reasonable accommodation by at-
tempting to find voluntary replacement for employee observing Saturday Sabbath; no obli-
gation to create exception to seniority system or pay premium wages for overtime work).
The employer is not required to prove that each accommodation proposed by the em-
ployee would result in undue hardship; it is enough if the employer has offered some ac-
commodation. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (school not required
to prove teacher's proposed accommodations entailed undue hardship; existing contractual
right to take unpaid leave constituted reasonable accommodation).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that
accommodation is not required where criminal statute prohibits employee's conduct);
EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 829 F.2d 519 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding employer's efforts to find
voluntary replacement workers and select workers for Sunday shifts on rotating basis satis-
fied duty of reasonable accommodation); Wisner v. Truck Cent., 784 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir.
1986) (finding employer reasonably accommodated employee by offering to move em-
ployee to alternative position that did not entail Saturday work).
73. See, e.g., EEOC v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 914 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1990) (partial ac-
commodation not reasonable); EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1990)
(same); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1989) (settlement offers dur-
ing administrative proceedings not reasonable accommodation); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel,
881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989) (employer made no effort to accommodate or prove undue
hardship); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978) (same).
74. Cf. United States v. Board of Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting free
exercise claim where Muslim teacher brought free exercise and accommodation claims
against school board for enforcing Pennsylvania garb statute). Some have argued that less
With the statutory framework in place,75 this Article now turns to
consideration of the constitutional issue: Whether a religious em-
ployer should be able to obtain an exemption from Title VII (and
other anti-discrimination laws) that goes beyond the aforementioned
statutory exemptions, based on the employer's right to religious
liberty.
B. Constitutional Issues: The Uneasy Coexistence of McClure and
Smith
As a review of the statutory framework demonstrates, religious
employers seek constitutional exemptions because the existing statu-
tory framework does not protect them from liability for common em-
ployment practices. Consider some familiar, and less well-known,
examples of these practices:
(1) Catholic doctrine prohibits the ordination of women as
priests, and only permits them to serve as acolytes or commu-
nion ministers in extraordinary circumstances;7!
(2) An employer with fundamentalist Christian beliefs refuses
to employ married women with preschool age children, on the
grounds that these women belong at home as primary
caregivers; 77
(3) A religious publishing house offers "head of household"
benefits to male employees with dependent spouses but refuses
to provide the same benefit to female employees similarly situ-
restrictive interpretations of the reasonable accommodation requirement would have
raised Establishment Clause issues by violating the principle of equal associational liberty;
the point is fairly taken. See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The
Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 593-94
(1991).
75. Other federal anti-discrimination laws provide no exemptions for religious em-
ployers. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a
(1988); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), amending 29 U.S.C. § 215;
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 and Supp. III
1991) (although private membership clubs that are exempt from taxation under § 501(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 are also exempt from the ADA's definition of a cov-
ered "employer," 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(ii)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 706-769 (1988).
76. Tim CODE OF CANON LAW: A TExT AND COMMENTARY, c.230, § 1 (1985). The
Vatican may change its position and officially approve the use of altar girls. Vatican Con-
siders Permitting Altar Girls, Cal. TRm., June 1, 1993, at 4. Local parishes routinely permit
women to serve as lectors (scriptural readers), acolytes and altar girls. Some parishes per-
mit women to serve as deacons. See generally Richard N. Ostling, Cut From the Wrong
Cloth, TImE, June 22, 1992, at 64.
77. Dayton Christian Sch. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985).
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ated, citing religious convictions regarding different roles for the
sexes;
78
(4) A religious employer discharges a white female typist for
maintaining a casual social relationship with a black man, citing
the employer's religiously motivated objection to interracial
relationships.79
None of these examples fits neatly into the statutory exemptions that
permit religious corporations and religious schools to discriminate on
the basis of their employees' religious beliefs. The religious beliefs of
the employees are not the issue in these examples; each of the em-
ployees or job applicants belongs to the same religious group as the
employer. The issue is the sex-and in the last case race 8 -of the
employee. Each of these examples describes an employment practice
that would probably render a secular employer liable for sex or racial
discrimination.
Although each of these examples does involve religion, this in-
volvement is irrelevant to the statutory analysis because the chal-
lenged employment practice is based upon a religious belief of the
employer. Sections 702 and 703(e)(2) permit certain employers to dis-
criminate on the basis of their employees' religious beliefs.81 But these
provisions do not permit other kinds of discrimination based on the
religious beliefs of the employer. While limited, the legislative history
of these provisions accords with the clear language of the statute. 82
78. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting
free exercise claim of religious employer).
79. Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rejecting the free exercise claim of the religious employer).
80. Liability for racial discrimination can be imposed where employers penalize non-
minority employees because of their relationships with or advocacy on behalf of minorities.
Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding
claim for race discrimination where employment is refused because of plaintiff's interracial
marriage); Reiter v. Center Consol. Sch. Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1985) (Title VII
prohibits discrimination based on an employee's association with Hispanic community);
Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (Caucasian woman subjected to hostile
work environment because of her marriage to Hispanic man); Erwin v. Mister Omelet of
Am., Inc., 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1456 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (Caucasian female has
claim for race discrimination based on her marriage to black male).
81. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, reprinted in SUBCOMMiTTEE ON LABOR OF THE Co~mn-rEE ON LABOR
AND PuBLIc WELFARE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNIrY ACr OF 1972 1843, 1845 (Comm. Print 1972) ("[reli-
gious] organizations remain subject to the provisions of Title VII with regard to race, color,
sex, or national origin"); see also Raybum v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Advent-
ists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Title VII does not confer upon religious organi-
zations a license to make [relevant hiring] decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national
origin."); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
290
Although the issue is a close one, the BFOQ defense may assist the
Catholic Church in example (1),s3 but that defense will be of no help
to the employers in the remaining examples. In short, nothing in Title
VII supports the right of a religious employer to engage in sex or ra-
cial discrimination.
To avoid liability for these practices, employers must argue that
even though their religious convictions may not trigger the statutory
exemption, their convictions are important on a constitutional level.
The Catholic Church contends that the ordination of women would be
contrary to Catholic scripture and apostolic tradition.' 4 Other em-
ployers have made similar claims as to their challenged employment
practices. 85 The question is whether religious employers have a con-
stitutional right to religious liberty that entitles them to contravene a
congressional mandate that sex and race are impermissible criteria for
employment decisions.
1. The McClure Case and Its Progeny
Mrs. Billie B. McClure was commissioned as an officer in the Sal-
vation Army in June of 1967. When she learned that she was receiv-
ing a lower salary and fewer benefits than similarly situated male
896 (1972) ("The language and the legislative history of § 702 compel the conclusion that
Congress did not intend that a religious organization be exempted from liability for dis-
criminating against its employees on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin.");
Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266, 268-69 (N.D. Iowa 1980) ("There is no
indication in the legislative history that when Congress enacted the 1972 amendment [to
Title VII that] it also intended to exempt sectarian schools from liability for sex
discrimination.").
83. Arguably, a woman who seeks ordination in the Catholic Church is not an ortho-
dox Catholic, thus the Church's refusal to employ such a woman is based upon her reli-
gious beliefs. This argument is spurious because some male priests, who have taken a
favorable position on ordaining women, are still considered orthodox. Moreover, recent
polls show two thirds of American Catholics believe that women should be ordained, and a
similar percentage disagrees with other teachings of the Church. Kenneth L. Woodward,
Mixed Blessings, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 1993, at 43. If willingness to ordain women is not
"orthodox" Catholicism, it would seem that orthodox Catholics are a distinct minority.
More fundamentally this argument would permit the Church to treat dissident members as
Catholics for purposes of membership, financial support and participation in church pro-
ceedings, but not "orthodox enough" for full employment opportunities. See generally
Lupu supra note 4, at 435-42 (arguing that religious organizations should be able to desig-
nate positions as "members only" without violating discrimination norms).
84. THm CODE oF CANON LAW, supra note 76, at c.1024. The Vatican reasserted its
commitment to an all-male priesthood in a 1977 pastoral letter, and a second pastoral letter-
on women's issues still under discussion reiterates the ban. See generally Bonnie Brennan,
Catholic Women: What Progress Have They Made?, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 3, 1991, at J1O.
85. See, e.g., EEOC v, Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700, 708 (S.D. Ohio
1990) (religious school limitations on family allowance based on "divinely ordained status
of individuals within the family structure.").
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officers, Mrs. McClure complained to her superiors and to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The Army demoted her to a
secretarial position and subsequently discharged her.86
Mrs. McClure brought suit against the Salvation Army, claiming
that she had been discriminated against because of her sex.87 The Sal-
vation Army did not claim a religious justification for treating female
officers differently than similarly situated males. Instead, the Army
argued that it was not an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII
because it was not engaged in an industry affecting commerce; that
Mrs. McClure was not an "employee" but rather a volunteer; and that
section 702, the religious corporation exemption, was applicable. In
the alternative, the Army contended that the application of Title VII
would violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment.8 8
The Salvation Army lost on each of the first three arguments, 89
but the Fifth Circuit agreed with the First Amendment argument. The
court found that the relationship between the Army and Mrs. Mc-
Clure was analogous to the relationship between a church and its min-
isters. It concluded that the application of Title VII to that
relationship would "result in an encroachment by the State into an
area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the princi-
ples of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." 90 Since
the Supreme Court favors judicial construction of statutes in a manner
that avoids constitutional difficulties where such a construction is
"fairly possible," 91 the Fifth Circuit construed Title VII as inapplicable
to the employment relationship between churches and their ministers.
As Professor Lupu has pointed out, McClure assumes the consti-
tutional issue instead of deciding itY2 While the holding in McClure is
framed in terms of congressional intent,93 the legislative history does
not support the court's holding.94 As Lupu puts it, McClure thus rests
86. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,555 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896
(1972).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 556.
89. Id. at 557-58.
90. Id. at 560.
91. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
92. Lupu, supra note 4, at 397 n.15.
93. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560-61 ("We therefore hold that Congress did not intend ...
to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister.").
94. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
"on a set of constitutional assumptions concerning the impermissibil-
ity of government intrusion into the church-minister relationship." 95
a. The Church Property Cases
The constitutional assumptions to which Lupu refers are drawn
from a series of Supreme Court decisions involving church property
disputes. The lower court decisions following McClure rely heavily
upon these cases to determine whether churches can be constitution-
ally bound by laws governing employment relations. A brief review of
the church property cases suggests that this reliance was misplaced.
The first significant church property decision, Watson v. Jones,9 6
held that federal courts should be bound by determinations of the
highest ranking church tribunal in resolving disputes between compet-
ing factions involving the ownership of church property. Subsequent
decisions continued to forbid judicial resolution of issues involving
religious doctrine 97 and required that deference be given to whomever
was legally empowered to speak for the church.98
This line of precedent took a slightly different tack with the
Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf.99 In that case, a Pres-
byterian congregation in Macon, Georgia, found itself in an internal
disagreement over questions of doctrine and practice. A majority of
the congregation elected to withdraw its affiliation with the Presbyte-
rian Council of the United States. A minority of the congregation
95. Lupu, supra note 4, at 396-97. Professor Lupu goes on to counter those assump-
tions and to argue in favor of a "members-only" principle. Id. at 432-33. Under this ap-
proach, religious organizations would have constitutional latitude to make employment
decisions based on their membership policies. Id. at 435-38. The organization would not
be entitled to base employment decisions on race, sex, or national origin unless member-
ship in the church turned on those grounds. Id. at 439-40.
96. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
97. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (judiciary may not resolve controversies over religious doc-
trine and practice in order to adjudicate disputes involving church property); Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (neither legislature nor judiciary may regulate
church administration); Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (dis-
missing suit against archbishop who denied plaintiff a chaplaincy because he lacked qualifi-
cations required by canon law); Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God,
Inc. v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring) ("[A] State may
adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it
involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or
the tenets of faith.").
98. In hierarchical churches, such deference is owed to the highest-ranking member of
the church hierarchy. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
709 (1976). In congregational churches, deference is directed to the majority of the congre-
gation. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 607-10 (1979).
99. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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wished to retain its national affiliation, and the two factions brought
suit over their respective rights to control the church property.
The Supreme Court was unable to determine which group was
entitled to Watson-style deference. Most Presbyterian churches are
congregational in structure, and the division of authority between lo-
cal congregations and the national council tends to be intricate."°
The Supreme Court chose to fashion an alternative approach that
could be used in cases where Watson-style deference was problematic.
In such cases, Jones v. Wolf authorized the use of "neutral principles
of law" in order to resolve intra-church disputes. Applying that ap-
proach, the Court examined various church documents from a secular
perspective to determine whether the parties had intended to create a
trust or other legal device to control the disposition of church
property.101
As various commentators have argued,0 2 Jones v. Wolf sharply
undermines any claim that the Free Exercise Clause confers a wide-
ranging right of autonomy upon religious organizations.10 3 While the
"neutral principles" approach does permit churches to structure their
internal affairs in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of judicial
nullification, this capacity is common to all corporate entities. The
capacity to minimize judicial interference neither supports nor ap-
pears to flow from a sweeping grant of institutional autonomy unique
to religious organizations. 0 4 Moreover, resort to neutral principles
may convince a judicial tribunal to overrule or disregard the position
of a clearly established church spokesperson. Such a result would be
particularly damaging to theories of church autonomy. 05
Even if the church property cases did support a strong theory of
church autonomy, employment discrimination cases are distinguish-
able. In many of these discrimination cases, the employee is not even
a member of the church; thus the dispute is not an "internal" church
matter-much less an ecclesiastical dispute.106 Moreover, there are
strong state interests present in employment discrimination cases that
100. Id. at 602-04.
101. Id.
102. Lupu, supra note 4, at 406-09; William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regu-
lating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. LT. 293, 313
(1986).
103. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 4, at 1390 (arguing that anything a religious organiza-
tion does amounts to the free exercise of religion).
104. Lupu, supra note 4, at 407-08.
105. Id.
106. Id.
go beyond the rights of the parties. °7 The church property cases, on
the other hand, rarely involve a state interest beyond the omnipresent
concern for a peaceful settlement of controversy. Nonetheless, the
church property cases continue to influence the lower courts in their
resolution of employment discrimination cases against religious em-
ployers. A number of courts'08 have explicitly relied upon those
precedents-and upon McClure-in exempting religious employers
from any liability for employment decisions involving "ministerial"' 0 9
employees.
In resolving the question of ministerial status, the courts look to
whether the employee performs sacerdotal functions, serves as an in-
termediary between the church and its congregation, has been or-
dained by the church, or serves as a church governor." 0 The inquiry is
107. Id. at 408-09.
108. See, e.g., Scharon v. Saint Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th
Cir. 1991) (dismissing age/sex discrimination claim brought by ordained chaplain against
church hospital on free exercise and establishment grounds); Minker v. Baltimore Annual
Conference, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (dismissing age discrimination claim of Meth-
odist minister denied pastorship on free exercise and establishment grounds); Rayburn v.
General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1020 (1986) (applying McClure to insulate church from sex discrimination claim
involving clergy applicant); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d
277 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) (applying McClure to all academics in
theological seminary since such personnel qualified as "ministers"); Simpson v. Wells La-
mont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974) (dismissing civil rights claims of pastor evicted
from church parsonage based on McClure and church property cases); Young v. Northern
Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 818 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (applying
McClure to insulate church from race/sex discrimination suit by probationary minister de-
nied appointment as "elder"); Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233 (Mich.
App. 1988) (finding musical director with pastoral/liturgical leadership role in church to be
a minister).
109. To determine whether an employee can properly be considered a minister, the
courts look to an employee's duties and responsibilities and place little, if any, weight upon
the employer's designation. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Semi-
nary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) (applying McClure to
all academics in theological seminary since such personnel qualified as "ministers"): Some
religious organizations hold that all their members are ministers. A court will not revoke
this designation, but it does not control the employee's status as a matter of law. Courts
that have construed ministerial exemptions in other statutes have not been persuaded by
claims that all members of a religious group are ministers. See, e.g., Dickinson v. United
States, 346 U.S. 389, 394 (1953) ("Certainly all members of a religious organization or sect
are not entitled to the exemption [from selective service laws] by reason of their member-
ship, even though in their belief, each is a minister."); accord Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1398 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990) (same holding as to
Fair Labor Standards Act); Olsen v. Comm'r, 709 F.2d 278,282 (4th Cir. 1983) (same hold-
ing as to tax laws);
110. See, e.g., Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396, Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283-84; EEOC v.
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981);
EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700, 706 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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flexible and depends in part upon the structure of the religious organi-
zation. In most cases where the employee performs largely secular
duties, the courts have found that the position is "nonministerial" and
refused to extend the McClure exemption to employers. 1'
b. The Limits of McClure
While McClure has enjoyed substantial influence, some courts do
not construe the First Amendment to prohibit all inquiry into the rela-
tionship between a church and its ministers. In Welter v. Seton Hall
University,"2 two Ursuline nuns took a leave from their religious or-
der to teach computer science courses. The sisters brought a breach of
contract action against the university when it failed to provide them
with terminal-year contracts required by their employment agree-
ment. The university raised a First Amendment defense, which the
court rejected because the sisters performed no ministerial functions
as university employees. 13
The Welter court suggested in dicta that even clergy should be
able to litigate disputes that do not involve church doctrine. The court
also noted that religious employers may "bargain away" any constitu-
tional privilege that might otherwise be asserted by issuing employ-
ment contracts or legally binding employment handbooks." 4
As a general rule, when members of the clergy bring actions
against their churches based on tort,"5 state law," 6 or the failure to
follow established church procedures,1 7 the courts have dismissed the
111. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982)
(editorial secretary in religiously affiliated publishing house not a minister); Elbaz v. Con-
gregation Beth Judea, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (education director at religious
school not a minister); Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(director of physical plant at hospital not a minister); EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch.,
751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (teachers and administrators in religious school not
ministers); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (receptionist/typist not a minister); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d
206 (N.J. 1992) (nuns on leave from Ursuline order teaching computer science not minis-
ters in their relationship with university).
112. 608 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992).
113. Id. at 214.
114. Id. No cases directly present this issue.
115. See, e.g., Higgins v. Maher, 258 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1080 (1990) (dismissing priest's tort claims against bishop citing entanglement
concerns).
116. See, e.g., O'Connor Hosp. v. Superior Ct., 240 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Ct. App. 1987) (or-
dered not published) (dismissing wrongful termination claim by chaplain against Catholic
hospital because of free exercise concerns).
117. See, e.g., Chavis v. Rowe, 459 A.2d 674 (N.J. 1983) (dismissing suit that alleged use
of improper procedures in "defrocking" former deacon).
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suit on First Amendment grounds. But there are exceptions, generally
where proof of the employer's wrongdoing can be accomplished with-
out inquiring into religious doctrine. For example, courts have been
willing to hear sexual harassment charges brought against a church by
an associate pastor who sought only monetary relief.118 Courts have
also heard defamation charges involving churches and ministers.19
As noted previously, 20 religious employers have raised the First
Amendment not only to bar liability for employment discrimination,
but also to avoid state reporting requirements and investigatory pro-
cedures that enable agencies to determine whether a violation has oc-
curred. A Sixth Circuit decision initially suggested that such
procedural immunities were available to religious employers.' 2' How-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed on abstention grounds"2 and indi-
cated in dicta that such procedural immunities were not
appropriate.'3 Courts and commentators that have considered the is-
sue tend to agree that there is no constitutional barrier that precludes
a state agency from investigating a complaint against a religious em-
ployer to determine whether the religious reason given for the chal-
lenged employment action is a pretext for illegal discrimination. 24
c. The "Regulatory Establishment" Defense
Although the constitutional basis for the "church-minister" ex-
emption in McClure was the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
118. See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. App. 1991).
119. See, e.g., Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993) (allowing defamation
claim to proceed, but dismissing breach of contract claim as too closely connected to eccle-
siastical matters).
120. See supra text accompanying note 20.
121. Dayton Christian Sch. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 961 (6th Cir.
1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
122. The Supreme Court held that the federal court should have abstained from adjudi-
cating this case under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which teaches that federal
courts should not interfere with pending state civil and administrative proceedings.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 41, 43-45. For an excellent summary of abstention doctrine and its
application in Dayton Christian Schools, see ERwI CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION, §§ 13.1 to 13.4 (1989).
123. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 628 ("[The state agency] violates no constitu-
tional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of [the] discharge in this case, if only
to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the
discharge.").
124. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Sch. Bd. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 460 N.W.2d
430 (Wis. App. 1990) (holding that state agency does not violate First Amendment by
investigating whether religious reason asserted as basis for discharge was in fact pretext for
age discrimination against lay teacher in religious elementary school); Lupu, supra note 4,
at 413-16 (arguing that any procedural immunity for religious institutions must be closely
tailored to a substantive immunity from state regulation).
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ment,125 some courts following McClure have grounded the
exemption on a combination of free exercise and establishment princi-
ples. 126 The Establishment Clause issue is whether applying the law to
religious employers will cause excessive entanglement between church
and state.1 27
These "regulatory establishment" claims are routinely invoked by
employers and supported by some commentators.'2 These claims
have been sharply criticized, however, on both theoretical and prag-
matic grounds. 29 Critics argue that it is oxymoronic to claim that a
regulation restricting religion simultaneously establishes religion. Two
more substantial concerns are that the precedent relied upon to sup-
port regulatory establishment claims implies no limit on their scope,
and entanglement concerns cannot be overridden even by a genuinely
compelling state interest.3 Moreover, regulatory establishment
claims provide a benefit to religious organizations that is not available
to secular businesses, resulting in religious favoritism.' Each of
these arguments suggests that the regulatory establishment claim mer-
its little attention by the courts.
Other scholars have argued that entanglement standing alone is
insufficient to support a finding that a law violates the Establishment
125. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896
(1972).
126. See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th
Cir. 1991) (dismissing age/sex discrimination claim of ordained chaplain against church
hospital on free exercise and establishment grounds); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Confer-
ence, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (dismissing age discrimination claim of Methodist
minister denied pastorship on free exercise and establishment grounds); Young v. Northern
Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 818 F. Supp. 1206, 1211 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (ap-
plying McClure to insulate church from race/sex discrimination suit by probationary minis-
ter denied appointment as "elder").
127. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), created a three-part test for evaluating
laws challenged under the Establishment Clause: first, the law must have been enacted for
a permissible secular purpose; second, the law's principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, the law must not create undue entan-
glement between the state and religion. Id. at 612. A law that fails any part of this test will
violate the Establishment Clause. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Lemon's current status.
128. See, e.g., Carl Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference
with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (1984); Note, Government
Noninvolvement with Religious Institutions, 59 TEx. L. REv. 921 (1981).
129. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 102, at 306-15 (arguing that the Establish-
ment Clause does not support exemptions from state regulation).
130. Id. at 306-07, 321-23.
131. Id. at 324-26.
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Clause. 3 The Supreme Court, for its part, appears ready to abandon
the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman133 altogether once a substi-
tute benchmark can be chosen. 34 In its last two terms, the Court has
communicated its distaste for the Lemon test by deciding each of
three Establishment Clause cases without reliance upon, or more than
a passing reference to Lemon. 35 Caught between the critics of regu-
latory establishment and the incipient demise of Lemon itself, the reg-
ulatory establishment claim can probably be safely interred.
To summarize, prior to 1990 the lower courts tended to hold that
the First Amendment barred judicial resolution of employment dis-
putes between churches and "ministerial" employees. Most courts in-
ferred the constitutional bar from the free exercise rights of the
church employer; others relied on the potential for undue state entan-
glement with religion. A minority of courts held that employment dis-
putes between churches and ministers which did not involve doctrinal
matters were not subject to the constitutional bar.
The cases upholding the constitutional bar often traced their un-
derstanding of the free exercise rights of religious institutions to the
Supreme Court's church property decisions. This line of authority is
problematic at best. While the Court's early church property deci-
sions indicate that courts should not attempt to resolve "internal"
132. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Recon-
ciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 673-74 (1980) (arguing that entanglement
should not be used as separate constitutional test); Laycock, supra note 4, at 1392-94 (con-
tending that entanglement is so imprecise as to be useless as an analytic tool); Gary J.
Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 905, 932-35 (1987) (asserting that entanglement prong is
unnecessary).
133. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test is described supra note 127.
134. Various members of the Court have expressed dissatisfaction with the entangle-
ment inquiry and with the Lemon test as a whole. See, e.g., Lambs' Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149-50 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (collecting cases in which Lemon has been criticized); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 668 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that entan-
glement prong creates an "insoluble paradox").
135. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2482 (1993) (holding that
state may provide sign language interpreter to deaf child in parochial school without violat-
ing establishment clause; not using Lemon); Lambs' Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (deciding that use of school property to show reli-
gious film does not violate Establishment Clause; using Lemon as alternative ground for
decision largely based on free speech principles); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655
(1992) (finding school sponsored graduation prayer violates Establishment Clause without
using Lemon). Justice Scalia has been especially critical of the Lemon test, likening it to a
ghoul in late night horror shows that must be killed again and again. Lamb's Chapel, 113
S. Ct. at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also, Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE
W. Ras. L. RFv. 795 (1993).
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church disputes, later cases approved the use of "neutral principles" of
law to resolve church controversies. This line of precedent does not
uniformly support a constitutional bar against judicial resolution of
employment disputes between churches and their ministers.
Employment disputes involving non-ministerial employees are
generally not subject to the constitutional bar. The most problematic
type of employees for purposes of the church-minister exemption are
teachers in religious schools. If their teaching is religiously oriented,
then the employer can attempt to prove that the position is ministe-
rial.136 Failing that, an employer faced with a Title VII claim might
raise a BFOQ defense or any other available statutory exemption.
Resolution of these cases is fact-specific. As a result, some cases are
particularly difficult to reconcile. 137
2. Employment Division v. Smith and the Response of the Lower
Courts
Smith involved two counselors at a drug rehabilitation center who
were terminated because of their peyote use during religious ceremo-
nies of the Native American Church. The state denied unemployment
compensation benefits based on a finding of work-related "miscon-
duct. 1 38 On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the denial
of benefits, finding a violation of the counselors' right to freely exer-
cise their religion. 39 The United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, directing the state supreme court to determine whether the
religious use of peyote was criminal.
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the use was
criminal under state laws, but again awarded benefits on the ground
that the religious use of peyote was protected as free exercise. The
United States Supreme Court reversed again. Justice Scalia, writing
for a bare 5-4 majority, framed the issue as whether Oregon could
criminalize the religious use of peyote without violating the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the Constitution. 40 Since Justice Scalia resolved this
136. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 282
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
137. Compare Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding religious school's
decision to discharge teacher for remarriage) with Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F.
Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (denying summary judgment to religious school that discharged
librarian who became pregnant out of wedlock).
138. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
139. Id. at 875.
140. Id. at 874.
question in the affirmative, Oregon could constitutionally impose the
lesser sanction of a denial of unemployment benefits.
The academic response to Smith has been sharply critical and vo-
luminous. 4' This Article will only consider the response of the state
and lower federal courts to Smith. A review of these decisions indi-
cates that the limited reading of Smith proposed by some critics' 42 has
found little favor. The bulk of the lower federal and state courts have
read the decision as a bright-line prohibition on exemptions from
facially neutral laws that "only incidentally" burden religion.
None of the reported decisions have squarely addressed the ap-
parent tension between McClure and Smith. Smith, however, does ap-
pear to be eroding McClure's precedential value. In Vigars v. Valley
Christian Center,143 a parochial school dismissed its librarian because
of her pregnancy out of wedlock. The district court rejected the em-
ployer's free exercise defense to Title VII, stating: "It is clear that Ti-
tle VII is a secular, neutral statute which, in this case, incidentally has
a profound impact on defendants' free exercise of their religion. As in
Smith, however..., such incidental impact does not constitute a viola-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause."' 44
Another federal court relied on Smith when applying the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to a religious employer. 45 And in
Black v. Snyder,146 a state court permitted an associate pastor to pur-
sue sexual harassment claims against her church employer and re-
jected the church's free exercise defense as precluded by Smith. 4 7 At
one level, Snyder is typical of a line of decisions permitting the imposi-
tion of tort liability against churches where religious doctrine is not
141. See sources cited supra note 29; see also Symposium: Religion in Public Life: Ac-
cess, Accommodation, and Accountability, 60 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 599-856 (1992). The
defenders of Smith are few, and their grounds for defending the decision tend to be cau-
tiously delineated. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled Free Exercise Exemptions and
the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HoFsrRA L. REv. 245,247-48 (1991) (defending Smith for
abandoning the "conduct exemption"); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cmi. L. RFv. 308,308-09 (1991) (defending Smith's rejection of
constitutionally compelled exemptions, but conceding that the opinion is unpersuasive and
that its "use of precedent borders on fiction").
142. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom Lan-
guage of the Constitution, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 672,683-84 (1992) ("Smith may turn out
to be primarily a drug case ....").
143. 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
144. Id. at 809-10.
145. Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
146. 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
147. Id. at 719 (finding discharge-related claims barred by Establishment Clause be-
cause of excessive entanglement, but permitting sexual harassment claims to proceed be-
cause claimant sought only monetary damages).
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implicated."' The Snyder court's use of Smith, however, suggests that
it did not consider the absence of any doctrinal connection to be
dispositive.
Lower courts have also used Smith to impose various statutory
regulations upon religious institutions in contexts other than employ-
ment relationships. For example, Smith has been found to compel dis-
missal of free exercise challenges to licensing laws prohibiting
corporal punishment in day care centers, 14 9 to campaign finance re-
form laws, 50 to property laws,' 5 ' and to workers' compensation stat-
utes . 52  One court imposed the reporting requirements of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act to religious employers who had
a sincere belief that their religion obliged them to provide employ-
ment to any person in need.' Another decision upheld the fraudu-
lent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code over a free exercise
objection. 54
This brief review of lower court decisions applying Smith compels
two conclusions. First, the vast majority of lower courts are convinced
that the Smith rule applies in civil contexts. Second, Smith and Mc-
Clure are on a collision course. If the McClure case were presented to
a court today, with precisely the same facts as before, could the court
still find that free exercise prohibits the application of Title VII? As
the next Part demonstrates, the answer is "probably not."
148. See, e.g., Gallas v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 587 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1989) (holding that church has no First Amendment defense to tort claims arising from
sexual abuse of parishioner by bishop, but finding claims barred by statute of limitations);
Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (finding imposition of punitive damages against church based on sexual abuse com-
mitted by pastor does not violate free exercise rights of church).
149. Health Serv. v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (hold-
ing that law prohibiting corporal punishment neutral and generally applicable under Smith
and finding no hybrid claim).
150. People v. LaPorte Church of Christ, 830 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that state action against church for failure to make financial disclosures required
by Campaign Reform Act constitutional).
151. Prince v. Firman, 584 A.2d 8,10-11 (D.C. 1990) (finding statute requiring reversion
of church property to contributors or their heirs upon dissolution of church does not vio-
late Free Exercise Clause).
152. St. John's Lutheran Church v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271, 1278
(Mont. 1992) (holding that designation of pastor as employee for purposes of workers'
compensation does not infringe free exercise rights of church).
153. Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice & Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42, 44-46 (2d Cir. 1990)
(citing Smith, but finding same result required by balancing test).
154. Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 152 B.R. 939 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1993).
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H. When Is a Law Neutral and Generally Applicable?
If Title VII is neutral and generally applicable, then religious em-
ployers are subject to the rule of Smith and must present a "hybrid"
claim in order to obtain an exemption. 5 5 This Part reviews the
Supreme Court's most recent efforts to explain the neutral and gen-
eral application requirement. While the meaning of neutrality re-
mains elusive, this Part concludes that Title VII qualifies as a neutral
law of general application under any possible standard. Finally, this
Part considers the somewhat counterintuitive position that the anti-
discrimination laws are not neutral because their exemptions accord
special privileges to religious employers.
A. Incidental Burdens and Dominant Effects
Smith elevated the "neutral and generally applicable" require-
ment to the first tier of constitutional importance, yet offered little
insight as to the factors relevant to that inquiry. One negative infer-
ence that can be drawn from Smith is that a law is not neutral if it
singles out religion for special regulation or bans conduct only when it
is performed for religious reasons. 56 The opinion also suggests that in
order to be considered neutral, a law may not have the suppression of
religion as its purpose, object, or dominant effect.'5 7 This formulation
is considerably more problematic to apply.
The "dominant effect" language echoes the second prong of
Lemon, which condemns laws whose "primary effect" advances or in-
hibits religion.' 8 This prong of the Lemon test has generated confu-
sion in the establishment context largely because the dual prohibition
is not easily avoided. 9 Even without the burden of a dual prohibi-
tion, however, the concept of dominant effect carries its own baggage.
Consider a law enacted by the mythical State of Restless in the
late nineteenth century. The law prohibits mass marriages. The draft-
ers of the prohibition, lacking any prescient inklings of the teachings
of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, intended merely to enhance the
solemnity and uniqueness of marriage ceremonies. Most would grant
this as a legitimate, if paternalistic, secular purpose. A century after
155. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
156. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990).
157. Id.
158. See supra note 127.
159. See generally William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It". The Supreme
Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 509-10 (1986) (summarizing and critiqu-
ing the Court's establishment jurisprudence).
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its enactment, let us further suppose that an enterprising prosecutor
attempts to enforce the law against the Unification Church. The
Church files a legal challenge, alleging that the law violates the Free
Exercise Clause.
From the perspective of the court, the terms "neutral and gener-
ally applicable" seem almost irrelevant. Does this law discriminate
against religion? What is its dominant effect? It is clear that the law
is a source of frustration largely to the followers of Reverend Moon,
but is that enough to justify a finding of non-neutrality? Does the
secular purpose of the legislation matter? Or should an entirely dif-
ferent showing be required?
If the hypothetical ban on mass marriages has a dominant effect
of suppressing religious practices, then it is difficult to know what to
think of Smith. The majority fused the question of effect together
with the issue of centrality, i.e., the extent to which the rule burdens a
religious practice of critical importance to believers. The majority
deemed questions of centrality to be beyond the judicial compe-
tence.160 It was remarkably unmoved by the fact that Oregon's crimi-
nal prohibition on peyote use fell primarily upon Native Americans
using the substance for religious purposes.1 61 As Justice O'Connor
observed in her concurrence, the questions are closely related.162
1. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
If Smith confused the issue of neutrality by not confronting it,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah163 erred in
the opposite direction. As the Supreme Court's only free exercise de-
cision in the 1992-93 term, and one that turned on neutrality and gen-
eral application, it was hoped that the case would clarify the Court's
intention. Unfortunately, what appeared to most observers to be an
easy case raised more questions than it answered.
Issuing four separate opinions, the Court unanimously struck
down four city ordinances regulating animal sacrifice. The unanimity
160. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
161. See id. at 916 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (noting that there is practically no illegal
traffic in peyote).
162. Id. at 907 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The distinction between questions of cen-
trality and questions of sincerity and burden is admittedly fine, but it is one ... that courts
are capable of making."); see also Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEo.
WASH. L. Rnv. 743, 757 (1992) (arguing that problems generated by the centrality inquiry
tend to occur on the margins; when it is beyond controversy that a law impinges upon the
spiritual core of a religious tradition, that factor should be given weight by the courts).
163. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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stemmed from the Court's finding that the ordinances were not neu-
tral laws because their object was the suppression of a particular reli-
gious practice. In their discussions of neutrality, the Justices
considered the intent of the city council, the identity of the persons
most likely to be affected by the ordinances, and the disparity be-
tween the council's stated goals and the means used to achieve those
goals. None of the Justices expressed a view as to which of these fac-
tors was most important to the neutrality inquiry, and there was seri-
ous disagreement as to whether the motivations of the city council
should be considered.' 4
Despite the Court's fragmentation, Lukumi Babalu did establish
some ground rules. According to a seven-member majority led by
Justice Kennedy, a law is not neutral if it either prohibits conduct that
is engaged in for religious reasons or discriminates against religious
beliefs165-formulations that could best be described as uninforma-
tive. The former prohibition was clearly descriptive of the Oregon
drug laws in Smith, while the latter is more conclusory than
illuminating.
The factors explicitly detailed by the Court lend little additional
insight. The ordinances did not explicitly target religious beliefs, yet
the Court was able to find that the "object" of the law was to suppress
the central religious practices of Santeria worship ceremonies. 66 The
Court based this finding upon the effect or operation of the ordi-
nances, which the Court found prohibited almost nothing but Santeria
sacrifices.1 67
While the reasoning of Lukumi Babalu may be muddled, the re-
sult the Court reached is clearly correct. The ordinances were aimed
at practitioners of the Santeria religion in all but name. As the Court
noted, a careful pattern of exclusions within the laws operated to pro-
tect existing restaurants and slaughterhouses and the killing of animals
for food consumption. This pattern of exemptions, the Court ob-
served, was so patent as to amount to a "religious gerrymander.' 6
164. See infra text accompanying notes 171-73.
165. Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2227.
166. While the Court did not focus on the "centrality" of animal sacrifices to the
Santeria religion as a basis for striking down the law, the Court did discuss the importance
of sacrifice to the Santeria religion. Id. at 2222-23, 2227-30.
167. One ordinance excluded Kosher slaughter and permitted the killing of animals for
reasons other than religious sacrifice. Id. at 2228.
168. Id. at 2229; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental cat-
egories to eliminate ... religious gerrymanders.").
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The Court also concluded that the ordinances were not generally
applicable 169 since they prohibited the killing of animals for religious
reasons and exempted most animal deaths caused by nonreligious rea-
sons. This demonstrated the council's intent to discriminate against
religion. 7 °
In a portion of the opinion that garnered only a single supporting
vote, Justice Kennedy considered the legislative history of the ordi-
nances. This analysis encompassed the events leading to their enact-
ment, including statements of council members and other city officials
as well as timing considerations (the ordinances were passed shortly
after the church announced plans to open a house of worship in the
city).17 2 Seven Justices refused to consider this evidence, and the
Chief Justice joined Justice Scalia's separate concurrence, which op-
posed the use of evidence intended to demonstrate the "subjective
motivation of the lawmakers." 73
2. The Tension Between Smith and Lukumi Babalu
Taken together, Lukumi Babalu and Smith send confusing signals
about the "neutral" and "generally applicable" requirements. It
would seem beyond contention that a law which makes it a criminal
offense to engage in a religious communion ceremony has the effect of
169. Justice Scalia would not have bifurcated the Court's inquiry into the "neutrality"
and "general applicability" of the Hialeah ordinances, since he believes that the terms
substantially overlap. Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring). Accord-
ing to Scalia, a law is not neutral if it explicitly imposes disabilities upon the basis of reli-
gion. Id. A law is not generally applicable if it is neutral on its face, but operates in a
discriminatory fashion against a particular religion because of its design, construction, or
enforcement. Id. However, only the Chief Justice joined with Justice Scalia in this ex-
tremely restrictive interpretation of neutrality and general applicability. Il.
170. The city exempted hunting for sport, slaughter of animals for food, eradication of
insects and pest, euthanasia and the use of live rabbits to train racing greyhounds from the
prohibitions of its animal cruelty laws. Id. at 2223. In this portion of the opinion, the
majority noted that the ordinances were both overbroad and underinclusive. The ordi-
nances restricted more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated goals
and failed to prohibit nonreligious conduct that caused the same harms as the prohibited
religious conduct. Justice Kennedy concluded that the council's interests in preventing
animal cruelty and protecting public health could have been achieved by more narrowly
tailored laws regulating the condition and treatment of the confined animals, as well as
methods of slaughter and the disposal of organic waste. Id. at 2228-30, 2232-34.
171. Only Justice Stevens joined this portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion. Lukumi
Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2230-31.
172. Id. at 2229-33.
173. Id. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia is well known for his opposition
toward inquiries into the intent of legislative bodies, in part because the motivating forces
behind group action are difficult to identify with precision. See generally Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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suppressing religious practices. If such an effect is truly an "incidental
burden,"' 74 rather than a "dominant effect," then there are two pos-
sibilities. Either the Oregon drug law was acceptable because it did
not single out the religious use of peyote but also banned nonreligious
use, or the statute had a "dominant effect" other than the suppression
of religious practices.
Neither formulation is entirely satisfactory. While the Oregon
law did not expressly single out the religious use of peyote by Native
Americans for prohibition, neither did the Hialeah ordinances specifi-
cally prohibit the killing of animals by adherents of Santeria. 175 If the
"dominant effect" of the drug laws in Smith is the prohibition of ille-
gal drug use, then the levels of generality implicit in the Court's analy-
sis may need to be reexamined. As Justice Blackmun pointed out,
permitting the government to defend a law based on general societal
interests rather than the specific governmental interest in denying the
exemption places a heavy thumb on the scales of the judicial
inquiry. 176
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Lukumi Babalu takes a very differ-
ent tack. He states that non-neutral laws are those which single out
religion for adverse treatment, and laws that are not generally applica-
ble are those that, while neutral on their face, operate in a discrimina-
tory fashion because of discriminatory enforcement or other
factors.177 Under this approach, the hypothetical ban on mass mar-
riages may be struck down, and the ordinances in Lukumi Babalu will
go, but most state laws will survive constitutional challenges. A prohi-
bition law, for example, which failed to include an exemption for sac-
ramental wine could probably be upheld, so long as there were no
difficulties of selective enforcement against a particular religious sect.
This approach is deeply unsatisfactory. The most compelling re-
sponse to Justice Scalia is found in Smith itself. As both the concur-
rence and dissent argued, an inquiry into a law's neutrality and
general application misses the point. Neutral laws can burden religion
174. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
175. Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2234-36.
176. Smith, 494 U.S. at 909-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Failure to reduce the com-
peting interests to the same plane of generality tends to distort the weighing process in the
State's favor."); see also Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Crm. L. REv. 317
(1992) and Frank Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 349 (1992)
(exchanging views on levels of generality in constitutional interpretation).
177. Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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as grievously as non-neutral laws, and at some point these burdens
become intolerable.178
Justice Souter's concurrence in Lukumi Babalu actually
presented the clearest description of the neutrality requirement. Bor-
rowing from Professor Laycock,179 Justice Souter identified three
types of neutrality: formal neutrality, which asks whether the object of
the law is to discriminate against religion; facial neutrality, which asks
the same question, but looks only to the text of the law and its opera-
tion rather than to the intentions of its drafters; and substantive neu-
trality, which would require government accommodation of religious
differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral
laws.8 0 As Justice Souter observed, the neutrality required by Smith
appears to be mere "formal neutrality."''
In short, Lukumi Babalu offers little more than competing visions
of neutrality and general applicability. While the majority's interpre-
tation of the requirement suffers from the pox of indeterminacy, a
sickness common to multi-factor equations, Justice Scalia's approach
offers a bright-line test that, like Smith, leaves too little religious con-
duct on the safe side of the line.
If hard cases make bad law, easy cases may do no better.' 82
While Lukumi Babalu identified a group of laws that fell short of the
"neutral and generally applicable" standard, it did little more than es-
tablish that the extreme end of the spectrum is indeed a constitutional
violation. The ordinances at issue were a thinly veiled example of
overt religious discrimination. Moreover, because the Court frag-
mented over such an apparently clear-cut case, it is difficult to predict
the application of the majority's neutrality test to laws that are not so
obviously defective.
B. Title VII: A Neutral Law of General Application
While the identifying characteristics of a "neutral and generally
applicable" law remain uncertain, 83 federal anti-discrimination laws
like Title VII are likely to qualify under any of the proposed stan-
178. Justice O'Connor expressed this position in Smith in a concurring opinion. Smith,
494 U.S. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter subsequently argued it in his
Lukumi Babalu concurrence. Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2242 (Souter, J., concurring).
179. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Reli-
gion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
180. Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2242 (Souter, J., concurring).
181. Id.
182. DEBORAH RHODES, JusTICn AND GENDER 281 (1989).
183. See supra notes 156-82 and accompanying text.
dards. These laws are not specifically directed at religious practice
and do not prohibit conduct only when it is engaged in for religious
reasons. On the contrary, Title VII exempts religious employers from
its prohibition on religious discrimination in hiring, and statutory de-
fenses like the BFOQ provision are available to religious employers.
Employment discrimination laws do not have the dominant purpose
or effect of suppressing religious exercise; rather, their dominant pur-
pose and effect is the creation of equal employment opportunities.
Even more fundamentally, the substantive provisions of Title VII
which prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, and na-
tional origin apply equally to all employers, regardless of their reli-
gious affiliation. Since the statute itself treats all employers equally
with respect to those prohibitions, the law is plainly neutral as to those
strictures. Cases like McClure, which limit the application of Title VII
to certain employment relationships,"8 4 do not in any way affect the
neutrality of the statute, taken on its own terms.
Title VII suffers from none of the flaws that proved fatal to the
ordinances in Lukumi Babalu. It does not specifically target religious
conduct-on the contrary, it exempts some religious employers from
its prohibition on religious discrimination.'85 While the statute
reaches a great deal of secular conduct and its provisions are broad,
none of its detractors have suggested that it amounts to a "religious
gerrymander." Instead, the legislative history of the federal anti-dis-
crimination laws demonstrates an unequivocal secular purpose on the
part of Congress to assure equal employment opportunities for all citi-
zens.1 8 6 In short, given the independent purpose of the anti-discrimi-
nation laws and the exemptions provided to religious employers, it is
difficult to imagine that those laws would not qualify as neutral laws
of general application within the meaning of Smith.
C. Religious Exemptions and Neutrality
Religious employers are likely to recognize that Smith reduces
the constitutional protection available to them, and they may be un-
certain of their ability to persuade a court that hybrid rights are at
stake. ' 7 Accordingly, some will probably attempt to distinguish
Smith by showing that anti-discrimination laws are not neutral and
184. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(l) (1988).
186. See generally Hearings on Civil Rights Act of 1964, H. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964), 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N., 2401, 2513-17; CHARLEs WHALER & BARBARA
WHALER, THE LONGEST DEBATE 198, 215 (1985).
187. See infra text accompanying notes 190-233.
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generally applicable, if only as a fallback to a hybrid-rights defense.
To do this, they must argue that the partial exemptions permitting dis-
crimination on the basis of religion render the laws non-neutral to-
ward religion. This argument reverses fundamental premises that
both Smith and its critics take for granted.
Smith divides the universe of laws into laws that are neutral and
generally applicable on the one hand, and non-neutral laws on the
other. Neutrality is critical; a majority of the Justices in Smith be-
lieved that persons seeking exemptions for religiously motivated con-
duct are not constitutionally injured by neutral laws. 188 This view has
been persuasively challenged,' 89 but all agree that only laws injuring
religious claimants raise free exercise issues. Religious employers
must argue that singling out religion for favorable treatment amounts
to a free exercise injury. This position would subsume Establishment
Clause values into the free exercise analysis to the exclusion of tradi-
tional free exercise concerns because giving religion preferential treat-
ment would be considered a free exercise problem rather than an
establishment of religion.
In short, if neutrality means anything in the context of free exer-
cise, it means that a law does not single religion out for unfavorable
treatment. Laws that favor religion raise Establishment Clause con-
cerns but cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said to present
a free exercise issue.
Moreover, even if religious employers attacked the validity of Ti-
tle VII's exemptions using traditional Establishment Clause analysis, a
victory would leave them worse off. If a religious employer persuaded
a court that, as applied to them, Title VII exemptions violate the Es-
tablishment Clause, the appropriate judicial response would be to
strike down the offending portion of the statute-i.e., the exemption.
The employer would be left facing a plainly neutral statute that un-
equivocally prohibited discriminatory conduct.
A claim that Title VII's religious exemptions are unconstitutional
would not help religious employers, even in the unlikely event of its
success. The religious employer would then have no arguably applica-
ble exemptions, and the Smith rule would clearly apply. As a result,
the employer would have to demonstrate a hybrid claim in order to
obtain a constitutional exemption from the statute.
188. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,891-92 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189. See sources cited supra note 29.
I. Hybrid Claims Available to Religious Employers
As the preceding Part demonstrated, the courts are likely to hold
that Title VII is a neutral law of general application, thereby bringing
religious employers who seek exemptions within the rule of Smith.
According to Smith, exemptions from neutral laws may not be granted
on the basis of free exercise rights alone. Religious employers who
seek to immunize their employment decisions must show that the ap-
plication of Title VII to their employment practices violates a consti-
tutional right other than free exercise. This Part will consider how
hybrid claims for exemptions are likely to be framed, and the difficul-
ties courts will face in evaluating such claims.
A. Associational Rights
A leading candidate for a hybrid rights claim is the guarantee of
free association created by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
considered the scope of associational rights at some length in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees,190 and identified two different aspects of asso-
ciational freedom that are protected by the First Amendment. First,
the Court recognized "intimate association," which refers to the right
of individuals to enter into certain close relationships without the in-
trusion of the state. This aspect of associational freedom was de-
scribed as an independent right of personal liberty.' 91
The second type of associational liberty derives from other First
Amendment freedoms, and is closely connected to them. The Court
recognized that individuals may wish to join together in constitution-
ally protected activities such as speech or religious worship to enhance
the public impact of their activities. In this incarnation, the right to
associate furthers the preservation and exercise of other individual lib-
erties. The Court dubbed this the freedom of "expressive
association."'9
1. The Right to Intimate Association
In Roberts, the Court found that rights of intimate association
would not protect a large and unselective organization like the Jaycees
190. 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (deciding that the application of state anti-discrimination laws
did not violate associational rights of Jaycees).
191. Id. at 618-19; see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1
(1988) (upholding application of state anti-discrimination laws to large private clubs);
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (upholding applica-
tion of state anti-discrimination law to California Rotary Clubs).
192. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
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from the application of state anti-discrimination laws. 193 The Court
found that rights of intimate association generally apply to the crea-
tion and maintenance of family units, whose essential characteristics
are relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity, and seclusion from
others. 94 The protection afforded these relationships recognizes their
importance in an individual's efforts to define a personal identity, to
obtain emotional enrichment and to cultivate and transmit shared
ideas and values.1 95 Because the Jaycees were relatively large, un-
selective, and permitted the involvement of women and other non-
members in many of their functions, they were unable to claim the
benefit of intimate associational rights.1 96
The same features that doomed the Jaycees' claim to intimate as-
sociational privileges are likely to prove problematic for religious in-
stitutions. While some religious organizations might be able to
establish a claim to intimate association under Roberts, the majority of
established churches are unlikely to succeed in doing so. While even a
large religious institution may play an important role in the develop-
ment and formation of individual identity, the other criteria deemed
necessary by Roberts-smallness, selectivity, and seclusion-are not
features regularly associated with mainstream religious institutions.
Since Roberts, the Court has refused to recognize intimate associ-
ational rights in a variety of settings. The Court in Bowers v. Hard-
wick' 97 upheld laws prohibiting sodomy as applied to consenting
adults inside a private home. However, the dissent raised the right of
intimate association as a basis for the laws' unconstitutionality.9 8
Two cases involving private clubs of varying size refused to recognize
the right of intimate association as a defense to the application of state
anti-discrimination laws.19 9 Overall, the Supreme Court has consist-
193. Id. at 621.
194. Id. at 619-20.
195. Id.; see generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE
L.J. 624 (1980) (identifying the rights and values protected by intimate association, such as
marriage and procreation); William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Associa-
tion, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 68 (1986) (discussing the application of anti-discrimination laws to
private organizations).
196. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-22.
197. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
198. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding city
law that prohibited discrimination by clubs that were not "distinctly private," i.e., that pro-
vided benefits to business entities and nonmembers); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (upholding state law requiring equal access to business
establishments as applied to Rotary clubs with memberships ranging from less than 20 to
more than 900).
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ently refused to recognize rights of intimate association outside the
context of marriage,200 procreation °1 and child-rearing, 2 and cohab-
itation with family members.2°3 Because the rights of intimate associ-
ation have been so closely identified with familial concerns, most
religious organizations would be unwise to place primary reliance on a
claim of intimate association and should instead turn their energies
toward a claim of expressive associational rights.
2. The Right to Expressive Association
As the Court recognized in Roberts, the right to associate with
others for expressive purposes is an essential concomitant of the indi-
vidual's right to exercise First Amendment speech rights. Protection
for collective efforts to assert constitutional rights helps to preserve
cultural and political diversity and shields the voices of dissident
groups from majoritarian suppression.2°4 Roberts also recognized that
the freedom of association presupposes the right not to associate with
persons not of one's own choosing.20 5 Thus, to the extent that the
imposition of anti-discrimination laws on religious organizations re-
quires the employment of "unwanted" individuals, rights of expressive
association are clearly implicated.
The right to associate for expressive purposes, however, is not
absolute. In Roberts, the Court applied traditional First Amendment
balancing principles and found that compelling state interests in eradi-
cating discrimination against women outweighed the Jaycees' interest
in free association. The Court found that the Minnesota Human
Rights Act served a compelling state interest unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression, namely assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services.20 6 The Act also tended to limit the stig-
matic injuries that result when women and other disadvantaged
groups are denied opportunities for economic advancement and social
200. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978) (striking down court-imposed re-
strictions on marriage licenses).
201. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977) (invalidating statute
limiting distribution of contraceptives).
202. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925) (holding that parents have
right to direct the education of their children).
203. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (invalidating
zoning regulations that restricted family members from sharing household).
204. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1983).
205. Id. at 623.
206. Id. at 625.
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integration?07 The Court found that the application of the Act to the
Jaycees represented the least restrictive means of achieving the state's
goals, and that the Jaycees had failed to show that admitting women as
full voting members would change the content or impact of the organ-
ization's speech or political activities.20
There are several obstacles that a religious employer will need to
overcome to establish a hybrid exemption claim based on the right of
expressive association. The first is best characterized as a hermeneutic
dilemma. The right of expressive association, according to Roberts, is
a derivative right to engage in other, independently protected consti-
tutional liberties. Free exercise rights, according to Smith, are inade-
quate standing alone to justify exemptions from neutral generally
applicable laws. What is lacking in a hybrid claim composed of free
exercise and expressive associational rights, is an independent right of
constitutional stature. Put differently, why should the combination of
two rights, each of which is inadequate standing alone to support a
constitutional exemption, suddenly assume constitutional
significance?
A second difficulty is even more imposing. In each of the cases
where private organizations have sought to resist the application of
anti-discrimination laws, the Court has focused its inquiry on whether
the organization would be able to advance its views effectively despite
application of the anti-discrimination laws. As Justice O'Connor ob-
served in Roberts, this test is not especially protective of associational
liberties. 0 9 In fact, each time the Court has so formulated the inquiry,
the association has been unsuccessful in its efforts to avoid the appli-
cation of the anti-discrimination laws.
As applied to employment discrimination, the Court's emphasis
on the ability of the organization to effectively advance its views pro-
vides very little protection to religious employers. At a minimum,
protection for "viewpoint" dissemination may immunize the selection
of ministers, clergy, teachers and other "spokespersons" for the reli-
gious organization. It may not even go so far. A Protestant church
that does not exclude women from serving as clergy as a matter of
doctrine and is internally divided on the issue-having appointed
some women to the clergy-would have a more difficult time advanc-
ing the "viewpoint" claim than, say, the Catholic Church, which ex-
207. Id.; accord New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988);
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
208. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-29.
209. Id. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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cludes women from the priesthood based on the apostolic tradition.
At any rate, such analysis is unlikely to immunize discrimination
against employees other than church spokespersons, because the se-
lection and retention of clerical, service, and maintenance personnel
does not affect a church's ability to advance and promulgate its views.
The single, most fundamental problem with predicting the
Court's approach to hybrid claims composed of free exercise and ex-
pressive association rights *is that the Court's analytical framework for
dealing with expressive association simply does not fit the typical un-
derstanding of religion. As noted above, the viewpoint test provides
minimal protection for any organization, since it narrowly focuses on
the organization's expressive purposes. The test reflects the factual
context in which rights of expressive association have been developed
by the Court, which is (as the name implies) closely connected to free-
dom of speech. Religious organizations, however, pursue goals that
go beyond, and may be entirely unrelated to, public speech and view-
point dissemination. Attempts to analyze the effect of imposing anti-
discrimination laws upon religious employers must take into account
the fact that religious organizations are concerned with more than just
their right to engage in public discourse.21 0
3. Justice O'Connor's Commercial Activity Test
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in Roberts, suggesting
that constitutional protection for association should not turn on
mechanical application of "compelling interest" analysis. Instead, Jus-
tice O'Connor favored the creation of a flexible standard that pro-
vided more protection for organizations engaged in purely expressive
activities than to those engaged in commercial activities.21'
This approach, which provides substantial guidance in evaluating
the claims of organizations like the Jaycees, Kiwanis Clubs, and Ro-
tary Clubs, is problematic as applied to religious organizations. Justice
O'Connor's test would provide comprehensive protection to religious
institutions that were not predominantly commercial in nature. A
publishing house with a religious affiliation21 2 or a foundation en-
210. Cf. William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Ex-
pression, 67 MN. L. REv. 545,546 (1983) (arguing that free exercise protection should be
coextensive with the protection afforded speech).
211. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
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gaged in commercial activity213 would not be entitled to the protection
of expressive associational rights. Churches, religious schools, and
other organizations whose primary activities are not commercial
would be protected.
The irony is that Justice O'Connor's more expansive reading of
associational rights would have the (no doubt unintended) effect of
swallowing Smith. Since her test does not take account of size or se-
lectivity, even large churches would be entitled to claim associational
rights so long as they minimized their commercial activities. Using
Justice O'Connor's approach, many churches could claim associa-
tional rights, in addition to free exercise rights, as the basis for an
exemption from anti-discrimination laws. Once a hybrid claim is es-
tablished, the state would be required to show a compelling interest in
denying the exemption. Whatever the merits of O'Connor's test
within the context of private club cases, applying her reasoning to hy-
brid right cases would reverse the presumption against exemptions
from neutral laws that Smith so carefully crafted.
In fact, under Justice O'Connor's approach, Smith itself comes
out differently. Members of the Native American Church would cer-
tainly be able to establish a right of expressive association, based upon
their lack of commercial activity. Once, a hybrid claim of free exer-
cise/associational rights is presented, Oregon would have to demon-
strate a compelling interest in denying members of the Native
American Church an exemption from state narcotics laws. In applying
the compelling interest test to the facts of that case, only one member
of the Court believed that the state's interest in denying the exemp-
tion was compelling-Justice O'Connor-and she conceded that the
question was close.214
The implication is clear. Smith by its terms suggests a far nar-
rower reading of associational rights than O'Connor's approach would
provide. If Smith is on a collision course with the rest of the Court's
free exercise jurisprudence, as many have suggested,215 then an expan-
sive reading of associational rights will hasten and exacerbate that col-
lision. Churches that present these claims will have the opportunity to
obtain exemptions from generally applicable neutral laws in many of
the contexts that the Smith majority was unwilling to countenance,
213. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (apply-
ing Fair Labor Standards Act to religious organization over Establishment Clause
challenge).
214. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903-05 (1990) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
215. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2243 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring); see also Laycock, supra note 29, at 2-3.
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including compulsory military service, payment of taxes, social welfare
legislation and child labor laws.216 If Smith is to have any doctrinal
significance, or even to survive as a rule of law based upon its own
facts, associational rights must be narrowly defined.
B. Freedom of Speech
A second candidate for a hybrid rights claim is the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of free expression. Rights of free speech and free
exercise frequently overlap, and many of the Supreme Court's "reli-
gion clause" cases can be equally well characterized as "speech"
cases. 17 In fact, it has been argued that the protections afforded reli-
gion under the Free Exercise Clause should be coextensive with the
protections afforded nonreligious speakers under the Speech
Clause.218 The Supreme Court may have partially ratified this view in
Smith by approving exemptions to neutral laws only in cases involving
hybrid rights, including the right of free speech.21 9
While the Speech Clause provides significant protection for reli-
gion in certain areas, including the right to preach religious doc-
trine, 0 the right to use school facilities for religious purposes,22 ' and
the prohibition on religious oaths as a condition of public office,222
this protection will be of little assistance to employers seeking exemp-
tions from employment discrimination laws for the following reasons.
1. Free Speech and the Employment Relationship
As even a cursory overview of the case law demonstrates, most
cases involving the right to free speech do not arise in the employment
context. Those that do tend to involve claims by public employees
that the government has in some way abridged their free speech
216. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.
217. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (statute requiring display of state motto
on license plates repugnant to plaintiff's religious convictions and violates free speech);
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (loudspeaker permit requirement violates free
speech rights of Jehovah's Witnesses using speaker for preaching); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requirement that schoolchildren perform flag salute violates
free speech and free exercise); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parade regula-
tions violate free speech rights of Jehovah's Witnesses).
218. Marshall, supra note 210, at 575-93.
219. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exer-
cise Exemption, 40 CASE W. IEs. L. Rv. 357, 364, 371-72 (1989).
220. Saia, 334 U.S. at 561.
221. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147
(1993) (schools); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (universities).
222. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (state may not make belief in God
a precondition of holding public office).
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rights.223 Cases in which the free speech issue arises on the em-
ployer's side, as a basis for resisting government regulation, are rare.
Employers are generally unsuccessful in these cases, for two reasons.
First, these cases mainly arise in the context of commercial speech,
which the Supreme Court affords only limited constitutional protec-
tion. 24 Second, the government interest in preventing harmful speech
has trumped the employers' right to free speech where that speech
was intended to further discriminatory hiring practices.22'
The paucity of case law that would support an employer's right to
assert free speech as a defense to an employment discrimination claim
is significant, largely because the defense was available long before
Smith. If the right to free speech were sufficient to avoid the applica-
tion of federal anti-discrimination laws, religious employers would
have been able to obtain exemptions on that basis all along, even
before Smith made the claim explicit. Because no such claim has ever
been raised, much less succeeded, the success of a hybrid claim com-
posed of free speech and free exercise would seem unlikely.2 26
2. Content Neutrality and Superfluity
Another difficulty with a hybrid rights claim composed of free-
dom of speech and free exercise has been pointed out by Professor
William P. Marshall, the leading proponent of limiting free exercise
223. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (government may not
discharge clerk-typist for making approving comments following Reagan assassination at-
tempt); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (government may discharge employee
for speech relating to employee grievances, rather than to matters of public concern); Pick-
ering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,574 (1968) (government may not discharge employee
for constitutionally protected speech).
224. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (establishing four-factor test for restrictions on commercial speech).
225. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 391 (1973) (government may prohibit single-sex, help-wanted advertisements).
226. Some may argue that religious employers had little incentive to raise a free speech
defense before Smith because they were unaware that hybrid claims were necessary to
justify an exemption. But this argument must fall when one considers the extraordinarily
limited number of cases in which free exercise exemptions have been granted by the
courts, not only by the Supreme Court, but by the lower courts as well. In Smith, Justice
Scalia suggested that only seven free exercise claims have been successful, and five of those
primarily involved the right to free speech. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-
82 (1990); see, e.g., James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. Rnv. 1407, 1459-62 (1992) (appendix showing 85 "Free
Exercise claims that lost" and only 12 "Free Exercise claims that won" in the U.S. Circuit
Courts between 1963-90). While Smith made the need for a hybrid claim explicit, any
employer able to raise a free speech defense had sufficient encouragement, based on the
losing record of free exercise exemptions, to present the claim.
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protection to that afforded speech 27 If a religious employer claims
that the right to hire and fire employees amounts to symbolic speech,
as well as a religious activity, then any special treatment by the legisla-
ture for such activities could violate the requirement of content neu-
trality imposed by the Speech Clause.218 Thus, to the extent that
employment actions are speech, they cannot be regulated based on
their religious content consistently with the demands of the First
Amendment. This dilemma further illustrates the inherent instability
of the hybrid rights jurisprudence created by Smith.
The final difficulty with a free speech/free exercise hybrid is the
simplest of all. The religious employer who seeks an exemption on
such grounds has gained nothing from Smith that it did not already
have. If the Free Speech Clause standing alone did not suffice to war-
rant an exemption prior to Smith, then free speech/free exercise hy-
brids will stand on no better footing. The religious employer will gain
little, if anything, from the joinder of claims.
Of course, this only serves to highlight the central analytical flaw
of Smith itself, namely that providing exemptions only to religious
claimants who can establish a hybrid claim deprives the Free Exercise
Clause of independent meaning. If the government conduct at issue
impinges upon the claimant's rights of free speech, or association,
then the claimant can argue that the law is unconstitutional as applied
on that basis alone, even without the free exercise component. In
short, the problem with a hybrid free speech/free exercise claim is not
only one of infrequent joinder, but of superfluity.
C. The Unenumerated Right of Parental Control
The problem of superfluity becomes even more apparent when
one considers the possibility of a hybrid claim composed of free exer-
cise and unenumerated rights, such as the right of parents to direct the
education of their children. This right of "parental control" was de-
scribed by the Smith majority as the basis for Wisconsin v. Yoder.229
Yoder exempted Amish parents of children over the age of sixteen
from state compulsory education laws.
An exemption based on a hybrid claim of parental control and
free exercise would face several overwhelming difficulties. First, if
227. Marshall, supra note 219, at 400.
228. Id.
229. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). A right of parental control might also be derived from Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (upholding right of parents to send their children
to sectarian schools).
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that particular hybrid claim warrants an exemption, yet free exercise
standing alone would not, then the Court has elevated unenumerated
rights over an explicit Constitutional provision.3 0
The second difficulty is that there may be no such thing as an
"unenumerated" right of parental control outside the context of free
exercise. Yoder indicated that parents who seek exemptions from
compulsory schooling laws for philosophical rather than religious rea-
sons would not be entitled to an exemption3 1 Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,1 2 another decision that arguably turned on the right of paren-
tal control, is equally dependent on the Free Exercise Clause because
the parents in that case sought to place their children in private
schools for religious reasonsP 3
In short, Smith's characterization of Yoder as a hybrid case may
be disingenuous. If the Supreme Court is directly presented with the
issue, the right of "parental control" may simply disappear into the
Free Exercise Clause and turn out to be a subset of free exercise rights
more commonly raised by individuals on their own behalf.
In any event, a hybrid claim composed of parental control and
free exercise is unlikely to be available to the majority of religious
employers. The right of parents to direct the education of their chil-
dren, if it exists outside the context of free exercise, simply will not
apply to the vast majority of employment relationships, as they do not
entail familial connections. Thus, as with the freedom of speech and
association, this avenue holds little promise for religious employers.
Conclusion
The example of employment discrimination in religious contexts
validates the concerns of many commentators who have criticized
Smith on theoretical grounds. After Smith, it appears religious em-
ployers will be unable to obtain constitutional exemptions from em-
ployment discrimination laws. Because the statutory exemptions from
those laws fail to protect religious employers from liability for com-
mon employment practices, it appears Smith has set the stage for a
serious reevaluation of the rights of religious groups.
Moreover, the analysis of hybrid claims suggests a fundamental
tension between Smith and the associational rights of religious groups.
If associational rights are broadly defined in the religious context,
230. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 29, at 37-39.
231. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
232. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
233. Id. at 532.
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then Smith itself cannot stand. If associational rights are narrowly
construed, then hybrid rights may be largely illusory outside the con-
text of religious speech. The latter alternative provides no protection
for religious employers; the former may provide a strategic weapon to
those who would overturn Smith and return independent stature to
the Free Exercise Clause.

